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ABSTRACT 
Prior research on personality and decision-making has failed to use adequate 
measurement of both constructs. The current research extended the previous literature by 
incorporating multiple measures of decision-making as well as the NEO-PI-3, a 
psychometrically sound measure of the five-factor model of personality. Five measures of 
decision-making were used which addressed various aspects of adequate decision-
making. The current research also included a measure of cognitive ability (WAIS-IV 
Vocabulary) as previous research has noted a strong correlation between cognitive ability 
and decision-making. Results indicated that cognitive ability significantly predicted 
performance on three decision-making tasks. In regard to personality, Agreeableness was 
the only personality trait found to be a significant predictor of any decision-making tasks. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Decision-making has no pre-established rules and no certain outcomes, yet 
individuals are able to make decisions on a daily basis. Decision-making is a response to 
a certain situation in which the decision-maker faces many possible actions, considers the 
probabilities of outcomes for each action, and evaluates the potential consequences of the 
outcomes (Hastie & Dawes, 2001). Individuals employ a number of strategies to aid in 
decision-making. One such strategy is the use of heuristics—strategies which often 
produce a correct solution (Matlin, 2009). While these strategies are robust in decision-
making situations in that they usually produce good decisions without much cost or 
effort, they also produce errors and biases (Hastie & Dawes, 2001). In using heuristics, 
important information regarding the situation is often ignored, making the decision prone 
to error (Hastie & Dawes, 2001; Sanna, Small, & Cook, 2004). Examples of heuristics 
used in decision-making include representativeness, anchor and adjustment, and 
availability. 
The representativeness heuristic involves making a decision based on the 
representativeness of the sample; if a sample is representative, fits the normal 
expectations of a given population, then it is deemed to be part of that population (Hastie 
& Dawes, 2001; Matlin, 2009). A classic example is that individuals are more likely to 
say that Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist movement when told Linda is a
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young, bright, out-spoken woman who is concerned with issues of discrimination and 
social justice, even though the probability of Linda being both a bank teller and active in 
the feminist movement is less than Linda being a bank teller. The description of Linda 
fits with individuals’ conceptions of feminists, so Linda is judged to also be part of that 
population (Hastie & Dawes, 2001).  
The anchor and adjustment heuristic includes making an initial approximation 
(anchor) and adjusting it in regard to additional information. Unfortunately, the 
adjustments are often insufficient and do not extend far enough from the initial anchor 
(Hastie & Dawes, 2001; Matlin, 2009; Sanna et al., 2004). Use of the anchor and 
adjustment heuristic indicates that decision-making is based on a pre-established anchor 
and subsequent information has little effect on the decision. This heuristic is present in 
the use of stereotypes; for example, when meeting an individual of a particular race, we 
often do not adjust far enough from our stereotypes (anchor) to adequately understand the 
individual’s unique characteristics, and therefore make incorrect inferences about the 
individual based on the stereotype (Matlin, 2009).  
The availability heuristic occurs when the individual judges probability in terms 
of the ease of thinking of relevant examples (Matlin, 2009; Sanna et al., 2004). For 
instance, if in regard to a specific city many occurrences of violence come easily to mind, 
one is more likely to judge that city as more violent than a city to which fewer examples 
come to mind.    
Decision-Making as a Skill 
Decision-making competence, the ability of the individual to use normative 
decision-making skills accurately and consistently in the decision-making process, 
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includes the ability to properly use heuristics but also the awareness that such strategies 
are not always sufficient for making a competent decision (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). 
Decision-making competence directly addresses heuristics and biases by assessing 
deficiencies in various decision-making skills in regard to accuracy and consistency 
(Parker & Fischhoff, 2005).   
Performance on decision-making tasks is also related to individual differences in 
basic cognitive ability, indicating an underlying, consistent difference in reasoning 
abilities (Stanovich & West, 1998). Decision-making competence encompasses many 
cognitive abilities, but it is believed to incorporate four basic skills: assessing beliefs, 
assessing values, combining beliefs and values to identify choices, and meta-cognitive 
understanding of one’s abilities (Parker & Fischhoff, 2005).  
The skill of assessing beliefs involves accurately judging the probability of the 
occurrence of an event. For example, an adequate ability to assess beliefs would result in 
an accurate estimate of the probability of getting the flu in the next two months. The 
assessing values skill involves being receptive to relevant task changes while ignoring 
irrelevant changes. For example, an individual who makes the same decision regarding 
ground beef whether it is presented as 80% lean or 20% fat is effectively utilizing this 
skill. This skill also includes the ability to ignore past costs and simply focus on future 
outcomes. For example, a good financial decision-maker would not consider the money 
already spent on a project but would focus on the probability of future success or failure 
of the project. The integration skill (i.e. combining beliefs and values) requires accuracy 
and consistency in applying decision rules. For example, when choosing a new laptop 
computer, an individual may have certain requirements, or rules (i.e. low cost, large 
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screen, average processing speed), which should lead to a specific outcome. Consistent 
and accurate application of such rules should lead to the correct option. Finally, meta-
cognitive understanding is conceptualized as having accurate confidence in one’s 
decisions. For example, an individual who is simply guessing at the answer to a true/false 
question would be accurate in indicating that she is 50% confident in her decision. 
However, if she was simply guessing and stated that she was 75% confident, she would 
be overconfident and indicating poor metacognitive skills in the decision-making domain 
(Parker & Fischhoff, 2005).  
Decision-making skills may also reflect the ability to avoid or correctly apply 
quick-and-easy, although not always correct, heuristics. These skills also reflect the 
ability to avoid common decision-making obstacles. The skills manifest themselves in 
decision-making tasks such as consistency in risk perception, resistance to framing, and 
applying decision rules. 
The framing effect occurs when the decision-maker formulates different decisions 
in regard to the same information presented in opposing frames. For example, one may 
decide that 80% lean ground beef is better than 20% fat ground beef even though they are 
the same. In most experimental manipulations of this effect, the problem statement is 
presented in two different frames in which the wording is slightly different but the 
information is the same (Hastie & Dawes, 2001). The general decision trend is to make 
riskier decisions in regard to negative frames and less risky decisions in regard to positive 
frames (Fagley, Miller, & Jones, 1999). People are more likely to take risks to avoid a 
loss and less likely to take risks to achieve a gain (Levin, Gaeth, Schreiber, & Lauriola, 
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2002). The framing effect offers support for the idea that decision-making is less logical 
and systematic and is based more on perception. 
Risk perception is believed to be related to the availability heuristic—judging 
probability by the frequency of occurrences in memory. While this heuristic may result in 
accurate risk perception due to the availability of commonly occurring events in memory, 
it is also subject to individual differences in memory content and contextual factors (i.e. 
exposure to uncommon risks) that can distort risk perceptions (Herwig, Pachur, & 
Kurzenhauser, 2005). For example, one may decide that getting attacked by a shark is 
very likely because of the number of news stories about shark attacks even though the 
risk of this occurring is actually low. Using the availability heuristic to judge risk can 
lead to incorrect estimates of risk because individuals base the estimates on instances in 
memory which often do not match the instances in reality (Herwig et al., 2005). Affect is 
also important in probability judgments of risk and is similar to the availability heuristic 
because it relies on memory and the affective associations of memory. For instance, 
individuals are often more concerned with the perceived possibility than the actual 
probability of an event, which helps explain why perception of risk is often inconsistent 
(Slovic, Peters, Finucane, & MacGregor, 2005).   
Applying decision rules assesses the accuracy of decisions and the individual’s 
ability to integrate information in order to make a decision. An individual’s ability to 
apply decision rules accurately has been found to be highly correlated with general 
cognitive ability, suggesting that this component of decision-making requires adequate or 
superior cognitive ability to be performed successfully (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). 
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While decision-making competence focuses on the processes and skills of 
decision-making rather than the outcomes, it is related to outcomes of good decision-
making, thus supporting the idea that better decision-making skills will often result in 
better decisions (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Parker & Fischhoff, 2005). In addition, 
decision-making competence is associated with real-world outcomes of decision-making, 
thus increasing its ecological validity beyond simple laboratory tasks. Among a sample of 
adolescents, decision-making competence has shown negative relationships with 
“maladaptive” risk behavior (i.e. antisocial disorders, externalizing behavior, 
delinquency, substance use, sexual activity) and positive relationships with positive 
family and peer environments (Parker & Fischhoff, 2005).  
The effect of age on decision-making seems to be different among decision-
making tasks. For example, younger adults perform better than older adults on resistance 
to framing and applying decision rule tasks. However, older adults perform better on 
tasks which require the recognition of social norms and resisting the use of sunk costs 
(e.g. money already spent) in making a decision (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007).   
Decision-Making Tasks 
Many decision-making tasks used in research incorporate an element of risk in 
assessing the adequacy of decision-making skill. The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) has 
been widely used to assess decision-making ability. It was developed to identify decision-
making deficits in individuals with damage to the prefrontal cortex (Barry & Petry, 
2008). Participants are required to selects cards from four decks that vary in probability 
and magnitude of rewards and punishments. Decks which provide immediate large gains 
also provide net losses over time (Franken & Muris, 2005). Less risky decision-making 
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on the IGT is considered to be better performance (i.e. better decision-making). Research 
has indicated gender differences in IGT performance, with men performing better than 
women (Bolla, Eldreth, Matochik, & Cadet, 2004). Research also indicates that 
performance on the IGT improves over multiple trials, but the gains in performance 
continue to occur for less well educated participants who perhaps rely more on emotion-
based decisions (Evans, Kemish, & Turnbull, 2004).   
Research relating the IGT to personality constructs has focused on two systems: 
the behavioral inhibition system (BIS) and the behavioral approach system (BAS). The 
BIS is believed to mediate reactions to expected punishment, while the BAS is believed 
to mediate reactions to expected reward (Franken & Muris, 2005). These personality 
constructs are usually measured by the BIS/BAS scale. This measure of personality 
includes components of the BIS (behavioral inhibition system)—anxiety in the face of 
potential punishment—and the BAS (behavioral approach system)—response to reward 
situations. Reward responsiveness and fun seeking are subscales of the BAS component 
(Franken & Muris, 2005, Suhr & Tsanadis, 2007). Good performance on the IGT has 
been found to be positively related to BAS, in particular the reward responsiveness 
component of the system (Franken & Muris, 2005). Conversely, Suhr & Tsanadis (2007) 
found poor IGT performance to be related to high reward responsiveness and fun seeking. 
These conflicting results require clarification and perhaps demand the use of more 
nuanced measures of personality.    
Better decision-making does not always mean making less risky decisions as 
measured by the IGT. The Balloon Analogue Risk-Taking Task (BART) is a measure of 
decision-making in which better decisions are considered to be those in which the 
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participant takes more risks. In this task, the participant is required to pump up a series of 
balloons. Each pump of a balloon earns points, but also increases the chances that the 
balloon may explode. The balloons vary on the probability of explosion (i.e. 1/128, 1/32, 
and 1/8). After each pump the participant has the option to “collect” all the points earned 
on that balloon into a permanent fund. Thus, greater risk-taking (i.e. more pumps) results 
in greater rewards, but the participant also has a chance of losing all points (Vigilet-Colet, 
2007). The task requires the participant to balance potential gain by adding to accrued 
points or potential loss of the points earned on one balloon (Bornovalova et al., 2009). 
Performance on the BART has frequently been investigated in regard to 
impulsivity. Bornovalova et al. (2009) found those low in impulsivity and sensation-
seeking to be more averse to risk when the magnitude of the reward or loss was greater. 
When compared to those high in impulsivity and sensation-seeking, those low on these 
traits are likely more sensitive to potential loss or are balanced in sensitivity to gains or 
losses. Vigil-Colet (2007) found BART performance to be positively correlated with 
functional impulsivity—the tendency to adopt impulsive decision-making when this 
strategy is perceived to elicit positive consequences. These results seem contrary to 
similar research with the IGT which found no correlation between IGT performance and 
impulsivity (Franken & Muris, 2005). It may be that personality traits are differentially 
related to risky decision-making depending on the advantages of risk-taking in the 
decision context. These incongruent results may also be due to the fact that the 
researchers used different measures of impulsivity. Again, it would appear that a more 
consistent means of measuring personality traits is warranted.   
 9 
 
Individual performance on decision-making tasks tends to be consistent across 
tasks (Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2007). Stanovich and West (1998) found 
significant correlations among a variety of reasoning and decision-making tasks. One task 
required participants to choose between one of two options based on statistical 
probabilistic information or concrete personal information. For example, the participant is 
presented with a scenario in which an individual is interested in buying a Volvo or a 
Saab. Positive information given by consumer surveys, repair statistics, and expert polls 
about the Volvo are presented along with one negative review by a close friend. The 
participant is to choose between buying the Volvo or the Saab. Preference for the Volvo 
indicates reliance on a large body of statistical information, whereas preference for the 
Saab indicates preference for salient personal information. The researchers also included 
the Watson selection task in which the individual must choose which of 4 cards (P, Q, 
not-P, not-Q) to flip over in order to determine the truth or falsity of a rule (i.e. “if 
Baltimore is on one side of the ticket, then ‘plane’ is on the other side of the ticket,” 
p.165), and evaluation of logical syllogisms in which half of the items were logical, but 
unbelievable and half of the items were illogical, but believable (i.e. “All mammals walk. 
Whales are mammals. Conclusion: Whales walk,” p. 165).  
Stanovich and West (1998) also found significant correlations among the 
previously described reasoning tasks and tasks measuring the use of heuristics. A 
measure of outcome bias—a heuristic defined as the tendency to rate a decision which 
resulted in a positive outcome more highly than a decision which resulted in a negative 
outcome despite the fact that the latter decision was based on more acceptable 
information (i.e. better odds of winning)—and a measure of if-only thinking—a heuristic 
 10 
 
defined as the tendency to have different responses to outcomes based on different 
counterfactual alternatives that might have occurred (i.e. becoming more upset with a 
negative outcome when it is easy to imagine a positive outcome)—both showed 
consistency with other measures of decision-making and reasoning.  
Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007) found that individuals performed consistently across 
the tasks within their Adult Decision-Making Competence battery. These tasks included 
resistance to the framing effect, the recognition of social norms, under or overconfidence 
in one’s decision, the ability to adequately apply decision rules, consistency in perceiving 
risk across different situations, and resistance to the consideration of sunk costs (i.e. 
disregarding the amount of money already spent in an endeavor when considering 
whether or not to continue in the endeavor). These findings indicate that errors in 
decision-making are not random, but that individual’s portray consistent differences in 
how they reason and make decisions (Stanovich & West, 1998). This lends support to the 
conceptualization of individual differences in decision-making skill as a viable construct.  
Trait Correlates of Decision-Making 
Individual differences in decision-making as a viable construct is further 
supported by research which has found various individual difference variables to be 
related to decision-making. Research has indicated relationships between decision-
making and reasoning tasks and various measures of cognitive ability such as SAT score 
and performance on Raven Matrices and the comprehension subtest of the Nelson-Denny 
Reading Test (Stanovich & West, 1998).  
Anxiety is also related to decision-making in that dispositional anxiety is 
positively related to a bias toward making risk-avoidant decisions. Both social anxiety 
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and trait anxiety have been found to be related to risk-avoidant decision-making. 
Furthermore, the relationship between trait anxiety and risk-avoidant decision-making 
was found to be relatively unchanged when negative mood was controlled (Maner et al., 
2007).  High trait anxiety is also correlated with impaired decision-making as measured 
by the Iowa Gambling Task (Miu, Heilman, & Houser, 2008). When comparing a clinical 
sample of anxiety disordered patients to those with other psychological disorders (i.e. 
mood and learning), the anxiety patients exhibited more risk avoidance than both clinical 
groups as well as a non-clinical control group (Maner et al., 2007).  
Trait anxiety has also been found to be positively associated with importance 
given to confirmatory evidence and negatively associated with the importance given to 
disconfirmatory evidence. Participants were presented with two jars, each containing a 
different ratio of colored beads (e.g. jar A: 80 blue beads/20 white beads, jar B: 80 white 
beads/20 blue beads). The jars were then placed out of site of the participant. The 
researcher chose a jar and presented beads one at a time to the participant. After each 
bead was presented, the participants indicated from which jar the bead was drawn and the 
relative probability that it could have come from that jar. This continued for 20 trials. The 
researchers were able to evaluate how participants adjusted their hypotheses regarding 
which jar the bead came from depending on whether they were presented with evidence 
which confirmed (i.e. another white bead after indicating that the first white bead came 
from jar B) or disconfirmed (i.e. a blue bead after indicating that the previous white bead 
had come from jar B) their hypothesis. Individuals with high trait anxiety tended to use 
evidence that confirmed their hypotheses and tended to disregard evidence which 
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disconfirmed their hypotheses when making adjustments to their previous hypothesis 
(Bensi, Giusberti, Nori, & Gambetti, 2010).   
Research has noted that state anxiety may better account for the association 
between trait anxiety and decision-making. For example, Bensi et al. (2010) found that 
trait anxiety was negatively correlated with the amount of evidence requested to make a 
decision. Given the relative proportion of colored beads in two jars, participants with 
high trait anxiety requested to see fewer beads chosen from a jar before they chose which 
jar the bead was taken from. However, state anxiety was also negatively correlated with 
the amount of evidence requested. When it was entered into the model, the relationship 
between trait anxiety and evidence needed for a decision was no longer significant. The 
variance of trait anxiety was better accounted for by state anxiety.   
Other personality traits have also been investigated in regard to their relationship 
with decision-making. For example, perfectionism may be influential in risky decision-
making in which the rules for reward and punishment are stated explicitly. Perfectionism 
predicted performance on the Game of Dice Task (GDT) in which the participants knew 
the number of trials to be conducted and the relative gains and losses of each alternative. 
However, perfectionism did not predict performance on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) 
in which participants are unaware of the amount of a gain or loss associated with each 
alternative (Brand & Altstotter-Gleich, 2008). More specifically, perfectionism in regard 
to concern over mistakes was positive correlated with non-risky GDT performance. 
Similarly, obsessiveness was also found to be negatively associated with importance 
given to confirmatory evidence. Participants who exhibited high obsessiveness tended to 
not use evidence which confirmed their hypotheses. Obsessiveness was also found to be 
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positively associated with the amount of evidence requested in order to make a decision. 
Individuals high in obsessiveness tended to request to see more beads before deciding 
from which jar the bead was taken (Bensi et al., 2010). 
Personality: The Five-Factor Model 
While investigation into the relationship between personality traits and decision-
making has utilized numerous personality traits, there has yet to be a thorough 
investigation of decision-making and personality traits based on a specific personality 
theory. Furthermore, most of the investigations into this relationship have failed to utilize 
measures of personality with sound psychometric qualities. The current study seeks to 
utilize the Five Factor Model (McCrae & Costa, 1987) in order to explain how 
personality traits may account for individual differences in decision-making ability. 
Previous studies have utilized versions of the most psychometrically sound measure of 
this model—the NEO-PI—but have either failed to find significant results (Brand & 
Alstotter-Gleich, 2008) or have used it with only one measure of decision-making 
(Hilbig, 2008).   
Broadly defined, personality is an individual’s characteristic patterns of thought, 
feeling, and behavior. One way researchers have conceptualized personality is as a set of 
traits—internal dispositions in socio-emotional functioning which tend to be stable over 
time and are usually conceptualized in bipolar terms (McAdams, 2006). Many 
researchers agree that personality as a trait can best be understood within the context of 
the Five Factor Model (Pervin, 2000). This theory is supported by research noting the 
substantial genetic basis of personality and the stability of personality over time. The Five 
Factor Model states that personality traits, as basic tendencies, interact with the 
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environment in shaping psychological structures such as habits, values, skills, schemas, 
and relationships (Allik & McCrae, 2002). In this sense, personality has causal and 
predictive value because it is the basic tendency of the individual toward certain attitudes, 
goals, roles, and relationships (John & Srivastava, 1999).               
The five personality traits (the Big Five) within this model are Openness to 
Experience, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism 
(DeYoung, 2006).  These five traits may be simply described as follows (John & 
Srivastava, 1999):  
Openness to Experience: intellectual, imaginative, and open-minded  
Conscientiousness: orderly and responsible 
Extraversion: talkative, assertive, and energetic 
Agreeableness: good-natured, trustful, and cooperative 
Neurotic: easily upset and restless 
Each of these traits may be further understood by describing the fundamental 
characteristics of individuals who are high and low in each domain. It is important to note 
that within each trait domain both high and low characteristics may be advantageous. 
While some characteristics of high or low trait presentation may seem more socially 
desirable, this does not negate the adaptability of the other, perhaps less socially 
desirable, characteristics (McCrae & Costa, 2010). 
 Individuals high in Openness are curious, willing to consider new ideas and 
unconventional values, and experience emotions more intensely than those low in this 
trait. Conversely, those low in Openness tend to be conservative in their beliefs and 
values and conventional in behavior. They tend to prefer familiar things and experience 
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less intense emotions. However, low Openness is not equivalent to authoritarianism or 
intolerance. Characteristics of individuals high in Conscientiousness include being strong 
willed, determined, and reliable. Individuals low in Conscientiousness tend to be less 
exacting and perhaps more hedonistic in their orientation. Individuals high in 
Extraversion are sociable, assertive, optimistic, and enjoy excitement. Those low in 
Extraversion (i.e. introverts) are reserved and independent. While introverts prefer to be 
alone and are not keen on excitement or stimulation, this does not mean that introverts are 
socially anxious or unhappy. Introversion should be considered the absence of 
extraversion, not the other end of the polarity. Individuals high in Agreeableness are 
essentially altruistic. They are sympathetic, eager to help others, and tend to believe the 
best about other people. Individuals low in Agreeableness are generally skeptical, 
egocentric, antagonistic, and competitive. It is important to note that being either high or 
low in Agreeableness may be beneficial depending on the individual’s environment. 
While altruistic behavior is something to be admired, critical thinking and a competitive 
spirit are also desirable qualities. High Neuroticism is characterized by the tendency to 
experience negative affect. It is also associated with a proneness to irrational ideas, 
general lack of impulse control, and poor coping with stress and interpersonal 
relationships. Individuals who are low in Neuroticism are emotionally stable. They may 
be characterized as calm, relaxed, and able to cope with stressful situations effectively 
(McCrae & Costa, 2010).  
Research has indicated that personality is related to decision-making primarily in 
terms of risk-taking behavior and the use of heuristics. Lauriola and Levin (2001) utilized 
a short adjective checklist as their measure of the Big Five personality traits and a forced 
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choice decision task as the measure of decision-making in which choices varied in 
outcome (gain or loss), value of the outcome, and the probability of the outcome. 
Participants were forced to choose between one of two contracts, one representing the 
risky option and the other a non-risky option. The contracts were of equal expected value 
in terms of the amount of money at stake and whether it was framed as a potential loss or a 
potential gain. The risky contract also presented information regarding the probability of 
the outcomes. The researchers found that high Openness and low Neuroticism predicted 
greater risk-taking when the contracts were presented as a potential gain, and high 
Neuroticism was associated with greater risk-taking when the contracts were presented as 
a potential loss. Additionally, Openness, Neuroticism, and Extraversion significantly 
predicted risk-taking when the goal was to achieve a gain rather than to avoid a loss 
(Lauriola & Levin, 2001).  
In regard to risky decisions and the framing effect, Levin et al. (2002) 
investigated the relationships between the Big Five personality traits, as measured by The 
Big Five Personality Inventory (Digman, 1990), and risky decision-making depending on 
framing effects. They presented participants with one of two scenarios which were 
objectively equivalent but differed in regard to framing. In the positive condition 
participants were told to indicate their preference for program A (1/3 of individuals will 
succeed in reducing risk of heart disease) or program B (1/3 chance of the individuals 
reducing cholesterol and 2/3 chance that none of the individuals will reduce their 
cholesterol) on a 7-point scale with the definite choice of either option A or B at the ends 
of the continuum. The negative condition required the same type of response but the 
information was presented differently. Program A included that 2/3 of individuals will 
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fail to reduce their risk of heart disease and Program B included 1/3 chance that none of 
the individuals would fail to reduce cholesterol and 2/3 chance that all of the individuals 
would fail to reduce cholesterol. As expected, risk taking was greater to avoid a loss than 
to achieve a gain. In regard to personality traits, the researchers found that individuals 
with high Neuroticism, low Openness, high Conscientiousness, and low Agreeableness 
were most likely to show the expected preference of risk to avoid loss. Individuals with 
low Extraversion, high Openness, and low Conscientiousness qualities were more likely 
to choose a riskier option in general. 
In regard to the use of heuristics, Hilbig (2008) utilized the NEO personality 
inventory and the classical city-size task to investigate the relationship between 
personality traits and the use of the recognition heuristic. Participants were presented 
with a list of pairs of cities and indicated which city in each pair they believed to have a 
larger population. The pairs of cities were matched so that a familiar city was paired with 
an unfamiliar city, and the familiar city was the correct choice in half of the items. The 
scores are calculated by finding the absolute difference between choosing the familiar 
city when it is the larger city and choosing the familiar city when it is not the larger city. 
A score of zero indicates use of the recognition heuristic because always choosing the 
familiar city will result in an absolute difference of zero. Any score different from zero 
indicates that the participant used some other information to come to a conclusion. 
Results indicated that high Neuroticism predicted increased use of the recognition 
heuristic in which inferences are based solely on recognition, ignoring other knowledge 
sources. The addition of the other four personality factors as predictors did not yield an 
increase in predictive power. Furthermore, the researchers indicated that this effect was 
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not mediated by accessibility of the participant’s knowledge (Hilbig, 2008). In other 
words, the positive relationship between Neuroticism and the use of the recognition 
heuristic is not altered by the individual’s knowledge of city populations.  
The level of Openness also influenced the impact of anchoring effects on 
decision-making. McElroy and Dowd (2007) used a short, ten item inventory of the Big 
Five personality traits and used anchor tasks (i.e. the length of the Mississippi River is 
more or less than 200 or 20,000 miles; the number of African nations in the United 
Nations is more or less than 85 or 25) to examine decision-making. Individuals with high 
levels of Openness were more influenced by high or low anchors than individuals with 
low levels of Openness in that they gave higher or lower estimates in accordance with the 
presented high or low anchor. Furthermore, when presented with a high anchor, level of 
Openness was positively related to estimate size (i.e. as Openness increased, the estimate 
increased in size). None of the remaining four personality traits significantly predicted 
anchor effects (McElroy & Dowd, 2007).  
The Current Study 
Lacking within the current personality and decision-making research is adequate 
measurement of personality constructs. Previous research has failed to utilize one of the 
most psychometrically sound personality instruments: the NEO-PI. Utilizing such an 
instrument may provide a solid basis for extending the current research to other 
populations and contexts. Prior research has used a conglomeration of personality traits 
with loosely defined characteristics. The Five Factor Model offers a cohesive framework 
from which to build future research and theory. 
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Prior research in regard to personality and decision-making also failed to include 
a variety of decision-making tasks. The current research extended the relevant literature 
by using multiple measures of decision-making which sample from a variety of skills and 
constructs within the decision-making domain. This allowed for more nuanced 
explanations of relationships between personality traits and various decision-making 
skills.  
Based in previous findings, the current research investigated the relationship 
between the big five personality traits and measures of decision-making. Specifically, the 
current research utilized the most psychometrically sound measure of personality traits in 
order to investigate the predictive power of personality traits on various decision-making 
tasks. That is, we employed the current version of the NEO inventories to assess the Five 
Factor Model of personality. Furthermore, the proposed research utilized both paper-and-
pencil and computer based decision-making tasks which cover multiple decision-making 
skills. We used tasks which address risk, framing effects, and applying rules. The IGT 
and the BART offer measures of risk-aversion and risk-seeking, respectively, as they 
apply to good decision-making. The three measures taken from the A-DMC address the 
decision-making skills of perceiving risk, applying rules to make a decision, and avoiding 
the framing effect. The research also included a measure of vocabulary to control for 
variability due to differences in cognitive ability, which has been found to be related to 
decision-making ability (Stanovich & West, 1998). 
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CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Participants 
 A power analysis was conducted using a test that all regression coefficients are 
equal to 0 in the population. First, we assumed a desired power of .80. Then, six predictor 
variables for main effects were assumed (five personality scores on the NEO-PI-3 and the 
WAIS-IV Vocabulary subtest) and five interaction effects (the WAIS-IV Vocabulary 
subtest interacting with each personality trait). Assuming a moderate effect size of R
2
= 
.15, 123 participants were needed to achieve a power of .80.   
Participants were recruited from a subject pool of undergraduate students at the 
University of North Dakota. Participants were offered course credit or monetary 
compensation ($20) for their participation. Due to time constraints, the final sample 
included 113 participants who ranged in age from 18 to 42 (M = 20.40, SD = 3.61). The 
sample included 40 freshmen, 36 sophomores, 15 juniors, 20 seniors, and 2 students who 
were in the fifth year. The sample consisted of 82 women and 31 men. 
Measures 
The Adult Decision-Making Competence (A-DMC) measure was used to assess 
decision-making competence (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). Following from the 
development of the Youth Decision-Making Competence measure, the A-DMC includes 
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tasks related to skills which are necessary for normatively competent decision-making. 
Across nearly 100 total items this measure includes six tasks including resistance to 
framing, recognizing social norms, under/overconfidence, applying decision rules, 
consistency in risk perception, and resistance to sunk costs. Internal consistency, test-
retest reliability, and correlations between tasks support the validity of the A-DMC as a 
measure of the unified construct of decision-making competence. The A-DMC also 
shows significant predictive validity in that is has been found to be associated with better 
decision outcomes (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). The three subtests of the A-DMC to be 
used in the present study are the resistance to framing task, the consistency in risk 
perception task, and the applying decision rules task.  
The resistance to framing task includes 14 problems of two types. The first type 
requires the participant to indicate his or her relative choice between two options. For 
example, the problem states that a pesticide is threatening the lives of 1,200 endangered 
animals; the participant must then indicate his or her preference on a 1 (definitely would 
choose A) to 6 (definitely would choose B) scale with Option A resulting in 600 animals 
being saved for sure and Option B resulting in a 75% chance 800 will be saved and a 
25% chance that no animals will be saved. Other item contexts include tax laws, disease 
outbreak, and investment in the stock market; the exact quantities and probabilities in 
each scenario also vary (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007).  
The second type of problem in this task requires the participant to indicate his or 
her judgment on a 1 (definitely no) to 6 (definitely yes) scale in regard to a product or 
situation. For example, presented with the information that 35% of graduating seniors say 
they have never cheated during their college career, the participant is asked, “how would 
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you rate the incidence of cheating at your university?” Other contexts include condom 
effectiveness, test performance, and cancer treatment. The resistance to framing items are 
repeated later in the survey, but the frames are reversed to reflect a negative frame. For 
example, 35% of those who did not cheat becomes 65% who did cheat, and the options in 
regard to the first example become certain death for 600 animals if Option A is used and 
a 75% chance that 400 animals will be lost and a 25% chance that 1,200 animals will be 
lost if Option B is used (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). Good decision-making would be 
indicated by consistent choices between the two presentations of the same information.   
The 20-item consistency in risk perception task asks the participant to indicate his 
or her estimate as to the chance of a specific event happening to him or her at two points 
in the future. First, participants indicate the probability of each event occurring in the 
next year, and then they are asked to indicate the likelihood of each event occurring in the 
next five years. Examples of such events include getting in a car accident, dying from any 
cause, dying in a terrorist attack, and being a victim of robbery (Bruine de Bruin et al., 
2007; W. Bruine de Bruin, personal communication, September 23, 2009). Good 
decision-making would be indicated by equal or higher estimates for the events occurring 
in the next 5 years than for events occurring in the next year.   
 The 10 item applying decision rules task requires the participant to choose which 
of five DVD players the hypothetical individual consumer would buy. The DVD players 
are described in regard to the four unique qualities—picture quality, sound quality, 
programming options, reliability of brand—on a scale of 1 (very low) to 5 (very high). 
All of the DVD players are equally priced. For example, the participant would read the 
following statement, “LaToya only wants a DVD player that got a ‘Very High’ rating on 
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Reliability of Brand,” and then choose the DVD player (A, B, C, D, or E) which he or she 
believes best suits LaToya’s desire. Better decision-making includes choosing the correct 
DVD player depending on the desired qualities presented in the scenario.   
 The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is a computerized decision-making task which 
measures risky decision-making. For the IGT, higher quality decisions are associated 
with less risk-taking. During the task, participants select cards from four decks. Each 
deck of cards has a different distribution of monetary gains and losses: two decks have 
negative expected value (i.e. high gains of $100 per trial but also infrequent high losses) 
and two decks have positive expected value (i.e. low gains of $50 per trial and relatively 
low losses). Adaptive performance requires remembering the payoffs and losses to 
identify the decks with the positive expected value. The dependent measure is the 
proportion of cards chosen from the low-risk decks over the last 50 trials. Participants 
complete a total of 100 trials (Henninger, Madden, & Huettel, 2010).  
The Balloon Analogue Risk Task is a computerized decision-making task which 
measures risky decision-making. Contrary to decisional quality on the IGT, higher 
quality decisions on the BART are associated with higher risk-taking. Participants view a 
series of 10 virtual balloons and earn money by pumping up each balloon. Each key press 
pumps up the balloon and adds one cent to the participant’s winnings. There is a low 
level of risk involved with popping the balloon. Decision quality is defined as the average 
number of pumps on the balloons on which the participants stop pumping and take the 
money (Henninger et al., 2010).  
The NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-3) is a 240 item self-report measure of 
the five personality traits in the Five Factor Model. Participants are to report the degree of 
 24 
 
agreement with the statements on a five point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). The NEO-PI-3 offers a domain score for each of the five personality 
traits: Neuroticism (N), Extraversion (E), Openness to Experience (O), Agreeableness 
(A), and Conscientiousness (C). Scores may also be obtained for the six facets within 
each domain as follows:  
N: anxiety, angry hostility, depression, self-consciousness, impulsiveness, and 
vulnerability 
E: warmth, gregariousness, assertiveness, activity, excitement-seeking, and 
positive emotions 
O: fantasy, aesthetics, feelings, actions, ideas, and values 
A: trust, straightforwardness, altruism, compliance, modesty, and tender-
mindedness 
C: competence, order, dutifulness, achievement striving, self-discipline, and 
deliberation 
The NEO-PI-3 has shown excellent validity and reliability across many investigations. It 
has also shown good psychometric properties in the evaluation of personality traits cross-
culturally (McCrae & Costa, 2010).  
The Vocabulary subtest of the fourth edition of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale (WAIS-IV) is a 30 item measure of verbal ability. Participants are asked to provide 
definitions for the presented vocabulary words which become increasingly more difficult 
(Lichtenberger & Kaufman, 2009). Of all the WAIS-IV subtests, Vocabulary provides the 
best estimate of overall cognitive ability. In factor analytic studies, it consistently yields 
the highest factor loading on g (Sattler & Ryan, 2009).    
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Procedures 
 After giving informed consent, participants were administered the WAIS 
Vocabulary followed by the PANAS. Participants were then administered the two 
computer-based tasks, the IGT and the BART. This was followed by the three paper-and-
pencil decision-making tasks. Finally, the participants completed the NEO-PI-3. Upon 
completion of all tasks, participants were debriefed regarding the purpose of the study 
and were given additional information regarding how they may follow-up on the results 
of the research.  
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
The primary analyses were conducted using a series of simultaneous multiple 
regression analyses. The predictor variables included were the Vocabulary subtest of the 
WAIS-IV and the five measures of the personality (Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, 
Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness). The criterion variables were the five decision 
making tasks: Iowa Gambling Task, Balloon Analogue Risk Task, and three subtests of 
the Adult Decision Making Competence measure (Resistance to Framing, Applying 
Decision Rules, and Consistency in Risk Perception). Means and standard deviations for 
each of the six predictors and each of the five dependent variables are presented in Table 
1. 
Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Ranges 
 
 Mean Standard Deviation Range 
WAISVocabulary 11.29 2.19 6.00 – 17.00 
Neuroticism 29.44 11.31 20.00 – 78.00 
Extraversion 53.96 10.83 20.00 – 76.00 
Openness 50.39 10.39 28.00 – 80.00 
Agreeableness 51.91 12.07 20.00 – 80.00 
Conscientiousness 54.45 10.82 22.00 – 80.00 
IGT 4.19 8.03 -17.33 – 20.00 
BART 26.42 11.87 4.39 – 57.14 
Resistance to Framing 0.97 0.41 0.00 – 1.93 
Applying Decision Rules 0.78 0.14 0.40 – 1.00 
Consistency in Risk Perc. 0.75 0.09 0.55 – 0.95 
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To test for potential interactions effects between WAIS-IV Vocabulary and each 
of the five personality traits, each of the six predictor variables were centered (score 
minus mean), and the products of the centered WAIS-IV Vocabulary and each of the five 
personality factors were calculated. These interaction predictors were then entered into 
the regression model for each dependent variable after the main effects had been 
removed.  
  When using multiple regression analysis it is important that the predictor 
variables approach independence (e.g. Knight, 1984). As the correlation between two 
variables approaches unity, regression coefficients can become unstable and inaccurate. 
Knight (1984) suggests a correlation of .8 as an unacceptable correlation between two 
predictor variables. The bivariate correlations between the predictor variables and the 
criterion variables are presented in Table 3. An examination of these correlations 
suggests an acceptable level of collinearity.  
The six predictor variables were entered into a simultaneous multiple regression 
analysis in which each of the predictor variables was tested after all other variables were 
in the regression equation. The analyses were conducted separately for each criterion 
variable and the results of the analyses are presented in Tables 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7. The 
significance of each predictor variable was tested with degrees of freedom of 1 and 106. 
The reported slope coefficient estimates the amount of change in decision making 
performance associated with one unit change in the predictor variable. The beta weight is 
a standardized slope coefficient that allows a comparison of the predictive strength of 
each of the predictor variables. The squared semi-partial correlation represents the 
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proportion of variance in decision making performance accounted for by each of the 
predictor variables after all other variables were in the regression equation. 
The results of the analysis of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) indicate that the 
overall model was not significant, R
2
 = .063, R
2
adj = .009, F(6, 112) = 1.178, p = .323. 
The summary of the regression coefficients presented in Table 3 indicates that none of 
the predictors significantly contributed to the model. None of the interactions 
significantly predicted performance on the IGT.  
Table 2. Regression Results for Iowa Gambling Task 
 
 B β t part r 
WAISVocab .521 .142 1.425 .134 
Neuroticsm -.016 -.023 -.181 -.017 
Extraversion .021 .029 .276 .026 
Openness .130 .168 1.667 .157 
Agreeableness .014 .022 .215 .020 
Conscientious -.031 -.042 -.356 -.033 
WAISxNeuro -.065 -.201 -1.299 -.122 
WAISxExtra .013 .042 .377 .035 
WAISxOpen .022 .077 .653 .061 
WAISxAgree -.067 -.211 -1.795 -.169 
WAISxConsc -.049 -.135 -1.036 -.097 
 
** Significant at .01 level  
* Significant at .05 level 
WAIS-IV Vocabulary and each of the Big Five personality factors were entered 
into the model as predictors of performance on the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART). 
Regression results indicate that the overall model was not significant, R
2
 = .054, R
2
adj = 
.001, F(6, 112) = 1.013, p = .421. The summary of regression coefficients presented in 
Table 4 indicates that none of the predictors significantly contribute to the model. 
However, the interaction of WAIS-IV Vocabulary and Openness to Experience (β = -
.256, p = .029) significantly predicted performance on the BART.
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Table 3. Correlations of Predictor and Criterion Variables 
  
** Correlation is significant at .01 level (2-tailed)  
* Correlation is significant at .05 level (2-tailed 
 
 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1.WAISV --                
2.IGT .18 --               
3.BART .10 .14 --              
4.RTF -.34** -.24* -.09 --             
5.ADR .54** .32** .29** -.34** --            
6.PCR .16 .25** -.01 -.02 .23* --           
7.Neuro .02 .01 .05 .04 .01 -.09 --          
8.Extra -.15 .04 .11 .13 -.09 -.003 -.32** --         
9.Open .25** .21* .16 -.13 .16 -.13 .14 .12 --        
10.Agree .03 .03 .02 .22* -.06 -.17 -.32** .10 .06 --       
11.Consc .11 -.02 -.11 -.03 .02 .02 -.57** .03 -.10 .28** --      
12.VocNeuro .17 -.04 -.11 -.23* .01 -.04 .08 -.32** -.06 -.15 .12 --     
13.VocExtra -.05 .07 -.03 .10 .08 .07 -.29** .31** .01 -.07 .04 -.31** --    
14.VocOpen .11 .06 -.18 .05 -.05 -.09 -.05 -.01 .31** .16 .02 .24* .06 --   
15.VocAgree -.01 -.10 -.05 .01 -.11 -.14 -.16 -.08 .21* .25** .05 -.26** .001 .35** --  
16.VocCons -.22 -.08 .13 .21* -.07 -.07 .13 .02 .02 .05 -.07 -.63** .09 -.17 .17 -- 
2
9
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Post hoc analysis of the simple slopes of BART performance on Openness to 
Experience at the mean of WAIS-IV Vocabulary and one standard deviation above and 
below the mean indicated that BART performance improves as Openness to Experience 
increases at a low level of verbal ability (b1 = .455, t(109) = 4.606, p < .05). However, no 
such effect is present at the mean (b1 = .219, t(109) = 1.788, p > .05) or high (b1 = -.018, 
t(109) = -.123, p > .05) levels of verbal ability. 
Table 4. Regression Results for Balloon Analogue Risk Task 
 
 B β t part r  
WAISVocab .532 .098 .980 .093 
Neuroticsm .016 .016 .124 .012 
Extraversion .122 .111 1.066 .101 
Openness .126 .110 1.087 .103 
Agreeableness .040 .041 .407 .038 
Conscientious -.129 -.118 -.993 -.094 
WAISxNeuro .042 .088 .576 .053 
WAISxExtra -.013 -.028 -.259 -.024 
WAISxOpen -.108 -.256 -2.209* -.205 
WAISxAgree -.008 -.017 -.147 -.014 
WAISxConsc .083 .154 1.202 .122 
 
** Significant at .01 level  
* Significant at .05 level 
The results of the simultaneous multiple regression using the Vocabulary subtest 
of the WAIS-IV and each of the Big Five personality factors to predict performance on 
the Resistance to Framing subtest of the Adult Decision Making Competence measure 
(ADMC) are presented in Table 5. Regression results indicate that the overall model was 
significant, R
2
 = .198, R
2
adj = .152, F(6, 112) = 4.292, p = .001. The summary of the 
regression coefficients presented in Table 4 indicates that the predictors of WAIS-IV 
Vocabulary and Agreeableness significantly contributed to the model. As performance on 
WAIS-IV Vocabulary (β = -.304, p = .002) improved, decision-making performance as 
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measured by the Resistance to Framing task improved, as a lower score of this task 
indicates better performance. As the personality trait of Agreeableness (β = .267, p = 
.005) increased, performance on the Resistance to Framing task suffered. None of the 
interactions significantly predicted performance on the Resistance to Framing task.  
Table 5. Regression Results for Resistance to Framing 
 
 B β t part r 
WAISVocab -.059 -.305 -3.239** -.284 
Neuroticsm .007 .202 1.715 .151 
Extraversion .005 .135 1.394 .122 
Openness -.004 -.100 -1.051 -.092 
Agreeableness .009 .267 2.836** .249 
Conscientious .001 .027 .242 .021 
WAISxNeuro -.003 -.191 -1.326 -.116 
WAISxExtra .001 .064 .620 .054 
WAISxOpen .003 .183 1.698 .148 
WAISxAgree -.001 -.085 -.765 -.067 
WAISxConsc .000 .015 .116 .010 
 
** Significant at .01 level  
* Significant at .05 level 
The results of the simultaneous multiple regression using the Vocabulary subtest 
of the WAIS-IV and each of the five personality factors to predict performance on the 
Applying Decision Rules task of the ADMC measure are presented in Table 6. 
Regression results indicate that the overall model was significant, R
2
 = .301, R
2
adj = .262, 
F(6, 112) = 7.616, p < .001. A summary of the regression coefficients presented in Table 
5 indicates that the predictor of WAIS-IV Vocabulary significantly contributed to the 
model (β = .532, p < .001). As performance on the Vocabulary subtest improved, 
performance on the Applying Decision Rules task also improved. None of the 
interactions significantly predicted performance on the Applying Decision Rules task. 
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Table 6. Regression Results for Applying Decision Rules 
 
 B β t part r 
WAISVocab .035 .535 6.182** .502 
Neuroticsm -.001 -.075 -.685 -.056 
Extraversion .000 -.033 -.373 -.030 
Openness .001 .046 .524 .043 
Agreeableness -.001 -.084 -.969 -.079 
Conscientious -.001 -.047 -.464 -.038 
WAISxNeuro -.001 -.097 -.730 -.059 
WAISxExtra .001 .093 .975 .079 
WAISxOpen .000 -.075 -.749 -.060 
WAISxAgree -.001 -.129 -1.280 -.103 
WAISxConsc .000 .001 .010 .001 
 
** Significant at .01 level  
* Significant at .05 level 
The results of the final simultaneous multiple regression using Vocabulary and 
the five personality factors to predict performance on the Consistency in Risk Perception 
task of the ADMC are presented in Table 7. Regression results indicate that the overall 
model approached conventional levels of significance, R
2 
= .102, R
2
adj = .052, F(6, 112) = 
2.016, p = .070. A summary of the regression coefficients presented in Table 6 indicates 
that the predictors of WAIS-IV Vocabulary (β = .219, p = .027) and Agreeableness (β = -
.200, p = .044) significantly contributed to the model. As WAIS-IV Vocabulary 
performance improved, decision-making performance on this task also improved. 
Conversely, as the personality trait of Agreeableness increased, performance on this 
decision-making task suffered. None of the interactions significantly predicted 
performance on the Consistency in Risk Perception task. 
Table 7. Regression Results for Consistency in Risk Perception 
 
 B β t part r 
WAISVocab .009 .219 2.248* .207 
Neuroticsm -.001 -.160 -1.294 -.119 
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Table 7. Cont. 
 
    
 B β t part r 
Extraversion .000 .018 .178 .016 
Openness -.001 -.157 -1.591 -.146 
Agreeableness -.002 -.200 -2.036* -.187 
Conscientious .000 -.058 -.501 -.046 
WAISxNeuro -.001 -.240 -1.574 -.146 
WAISxExtra .000 -.027 -.252 -.023 
WAISxOpen .000 .047 .405 .037 
WAISxAgree -.001 -.153 -1.321 -.122 
WAISxConsc .000 -.108 -.845 -.078 
 
** Significant at .01 level  
* Significant at .05 level 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
 Results of the multiple regression analyses indicate that personality traits as 
measured by the NEO-PI-3 were not significant predictors of the IGT, BART, or the 
Applying Decision Rules task of the ADMC. However, the results indicate that the 
personality trait of Agreeableness is a significant predictor of performance on the 
Resistance to Framing and Consistency in Risk Perception tasks of the ADMC. The 
strongest predictor across decision-making tasks appears to be verbal ability as measured 
by the Vocabulary subtest of the WAIS-IV. It was found to be a significant predictor of 
performance on all three ADMC tasks. Only one interaction effect was found to be 
significant. The interaction of Openness to Experience and WAIS-IV Vocabulary 
significantly predicted variance in performance on the BART in such a way that at lower 
levels of verbal ability increased Openness to Experience predicted better performance on 
the BART. 
 The predictive power of the WAIS-IV Vocabulary subtest for each of ADMC 
tasks supports the role of cognitive ability in decision-making competence. The 
Vocabulary subtest accounted for 8%, 25%, and 4% of the variance in decision-making 
performance on the Resistance to Framing, Applying Decision Rules, and Consistency in 
Risk Perception tasks, respectively. This was the most variance accounted for by any 
predictor in the respective regression analyses.  
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This finding is not surprising given the prior research. Reasoning abilities, which 
strongly reflect the basic skills of accuracy and consistency in assessing beliefs and 
values, integrating information, and monitoring cognition necessary for decision-making, 
have been found to be related to individual differences in cognitive ability as measured 
by SAT score, performance on Raven’s Matrices, and reading comprehension tests 
(Stanovich & West, 1998). Parker and Fischhoff (2005) found measures of resistance to 
framing and applying decision rules to be significantly correlated with measures of both 
verbal ability and non-verbal ability as measured by subtests of the WISC-R (i.e. 
vocabulary, block design, picture arrangement, and object assembly). The researchers 
also found an overall measure of decision-making competence, which included the three 
paper-and-pencil tasks used in the current research, to be significantly correlated with the 
verbal and non-verbal measures of cognitive ability. Similarly, in the validation process 
of the ADMC, better performance on each task was related to higher levels of cognitive 
ability (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). 
The significant prediction of decision-making tasks by Agreeableness is 
congruent with some prior research, but it has not been found to be a consistently strong 
predictor of decision-making. Levin at al. (2002) found Agreeableness and 
Conscientiousness to significantly account for variability in both an attribute framing 
effect (i.e. evaluating 80% lean versus 20% fat ground beef), in which higher 
Agreeableness was related to increased salience of the effect (e.g. more positive 
evaluation in the positive frame, which indicates poorer decision-making), and a risky-
choice framing effect (e.g. choosing between programs A and B in both a positive and 
negative frame regarding proportions of people who will or will not reduce their 
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cholesteral), in which highly Agreeable individuals do not show a preference for taking 
risk in a negative frame compared to a positive frame. Low Agreeableness, as measured 
by The Big Five Inventory, has also been found to be related to inconsistency in risk 
preference (Soane & Chmiel, 2005). These prior findings are consistent with the current 
findings in which Agreeableness was related to poorer performance on Resistance to 
Framing and Consistency in Risk Perception tasks. Perhaps highly agreeable individuals 
tend to place more emphasis on positive information, which makes them unable to 
adequately assess risks and probabilities.  
 Given prior research, the absence of predictive power for some of the personality 
traits was surprising. High scores in Neuroticism, Openness to Experience, and 
Conscientiousness have been found to predict greater inconsistency in risk perception 
(Soane & Chmiel, 2005). In the current research, only Agreeableness predicted 
performance on Consistency in Risk Perception with highly agreeable individuals being 
more inconsistent. Openness to Experience has also been found to be related to greater 
susceptibility to anchoring effects (McElroy & Dowd, 2007). One would have expected 
this influence to have negatively impacted performance on decision-making tasks, 
especially Resistance to Framing and Consistency in Risk Perception which rely heavily 
on the individual’s initial perception of the events. However, in the current research, 
Openness to Experience did not significantly predict decision-making performance on 
any of the five tasks. 
Lauriola and Levin (2001) found both Neuroticism and Openness to Experience, 
as measured by a short adjective checklist, to be significant predictors of risk taking to 
achieve a gain. One would have expected those low in Neuroticism or high in Openness 
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to Experience to show better performance on the BART, in which better performance 
indicates a willingness to take risks (i.e. more pumps) to achieve a gain (i.e. more 
money). Conversely, Lauriola and Levin (2001) also found high Neuroticism to predict 
greater risk-taking to avoid a loss. Similarly, Lauriola, Russo, Lucidi, Violani, and Levin 
(2005) found negative affective traits (e.g. neuroticism) to significantly predict risk-
seeking in a negatively framed scenario.  
This differential prediction of risk-taking would indicate that Neuroticism plays a 
role in resistance to framing in that the frame of the information (positive or negative) 
impacts the decision-making (risk-taking). However, Neuroticism was not a significant 
predictor of any of the five decision-making tasks in the current research. One 
explanation of these discrepant findings may be in the personality measure used in the 
current study. The NEO-PI-3 is a more reliable and valid measure of the Big Five 
personality traits than the adjective checklist used by Lauriola and Levin (2001). It may 
also be that previous research used insufficient decision-making tasks. For example, 
Lauriola and Levin (2001) and Lauriola et al. (2005) used forced choice tasks in which 
the participants had to choose between a certain/safe option and a risky option. This may 
not allow for nuanced measurement of the degree of risk an individual is willing to take. 
Rating preferences on a continuum, which is the response method of the Resistance to 
Framing task, may allow for greater understanding of the relationship between 
personality traits and the degree of risk an individual is willing to take given a specific 
scenario.    
 Another unexpected, but interesting finding, was the prediction of BART 
performance by the interaction of Openness to Experience and WAIS-IV Vocabulary. As 
 38 
 
noted in the previous paragraphs, prior research found Openness to Experience to predict 
risk taking to achieve a gain (Lauriola & Levin, 2001). This is consistent with the current 
finding that higher levels of Openness to Experience were related to better BART 
performance (e.g. more risk taking to achieve a gain), but this was only true for those 
with a low level of verbal ability. Perhaps personality traits moderate the relationship 
between decision-making skill and cognitive ability for certain types of decision-making. 
In this instance, high Openness to Experience, which has components of intellectual 
curiosity and willingness to reexamine values (McCrae & Costa, 2010), may aid in better 
decision-making for those who are less cognitively able.  
The previously described interaction effect may also help explain the dichotomy 
of “hot” affective decision-making, which involves relying on emotional responses, and 
“cold” cognitive decision-making, which involves relying on rational determination of 
risks and benefits. It is believed that “hot” decision-making assists “cold” decision-
making by unconsciously biasing the individual’s response toward that consistent with 
the emotional state brought forth by the decision context. Studies using the IGT and 
measures of skin conductance indicate that the IGT may incorporate aspects of “hot” 
decision-making (Buelow & Suhr, 2009).  
Individuals who are low in cognitive ability, which has been found to be 
significantly correlated with decision-making (e.g. Stanovich & West, 1998; Parker & 
Fischhoff, 2005; Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007), may perform better on tasks of “hot” 
decision-making such as the IGT and the BART and worse on tasks of “cold” decision-
making such as Applying Decision Rules. Personality may moderate this relationship 
depending on the relative emotional or cognitive component of the trait. For example, 
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highly neurotic individuals may rely on “hot” decision-making, which may produce 
better or worse performance depending on the task. Alternatively, highly conscientious 
individuals may rely on “cold” decision-making and suppress “hot” decision-making 
processes, which may also produce better or worse performance depending on the task.  
Unfortunately, the correlational data from the current research does not 
necessarily support a strict dichotomy between supposedly “cold” and “hot” decision-
making tasks. The IGT and the BART were not significantly related, although the IGT 
was significantly correlated with all three ADMC measures and the BART was correlated 
with the Applying Decision Rules task. It is more likely that the current measures of 
decision-making include aspects of both processes. This equivalence of “hot” and “cold” 
processes in the IGT has also been proposed (Brand et al., 2007, as cited by Buelow & 
Suhr, 2009). 
 A limitation of the current research is the small sample size drawn from a 
homogenous population of undergraduate students at a Midwestern university. The power 
analysis designated a need for 123 participants to detect a moderate effect at a power of 
.80. Post hoc power analysis indicated poor power to detect the effect for the IGT (power 
= .34), BART (power = .28), and the Consistency in Risk Perception task (power = .61), 
but adequate power to detect the effect for the Resistance to Framing task (power = .95) 
and the Applying Decision Rules task (power = .99). For some of these measures, a larger 
sample size may have contributed to detection of the effect. However, it is unlikely that 
even the recommended sample size of 123 would have been sufficient to detect the 
effects of either the IGT or the BART given their very poor post-hoc power values. 
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 The sample was also taken from a homogeneous sample based on age and 
location. The mean age of participants was 20, thus the results of this study apply 
primarily to college-aged adults. Similarly, the participants were all taken from a 
relatively small Midwestern university located in a small Midwestern city. It is possible 
that similar results would not be found with a more diverse sample. Prior research has 
indicated differential performance on decision-making tasks related to age. For example, 
younger adults performed better than older adults on resistance to framing and applying 
decision rule tasks, while older adults performed better on recognition of social norms 
and resistance to sunk costs tasks (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007). Future research may 
benefit from obtaining a sample with a wider age range or comparing predictors 
according to age group.  
 A potential limitation of the current study is the use of only one measure of 
cognitive ability. Considering the predictive power of the Vocabulary subtest of the 
WAIS-IV, future research may incorporate more measures of cognitive ability to best 
ascertain the predictive power of this individual variable on decision-making skill or to 
control for this variable in the investigation of other variables (i.e. personality). Using 
eight tests of cognitive ability (i.e. immediate memory, delayed memory, recognition 
memory, digit span, simple reaction time, choice reaction time, digit-symbol, and 
Stroop), Henninger et al. (2010) compared the performance of younger and older adults 
on the IGT and the BART. After accounting for the effects of cognitive ability, no age 
related differences in decision-making performance were evident. More specifically, the 
eight cognitive ability measures were factor analyzed into processing speed and memory. 
These two components differentially predicted decision-making performance on the 
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BART and the IGT, with greater processing speed linked to better choices on the BART 
and greater memory performance linked to greater decision quality on the IGT. More 
precise measures of cognitive ability, such as those used by Henninger et al. (2010), may 
allow for more nuanced understanding of the contribution of cognitive ability to decision 
quality across decision-making tasks. 
Future research in the area of decision-making may continue to use multiple 
decision-making measures in order to address the various skills required for adequate 
decision-making. It would appear that the current measurement of decision-making is 
fragmented as evidenced by the inconsistent findings among the five decision-making 
measures in the current research. While it may be difficult to develop a measure of 
overall decision-making skill, an effort to create a measurement that combines the 
various decision-making skills into a more cohesive and consistent framework may be 
warranted. Factor analytic methods may be used to derive basic decision-making skills 
from the existing measures. Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007) attempted to create an overall 
measure of decision-making, the ADMC, but this measure may be missing some of the 
emotional or “hot” decision-making processes discussed previously as it is highly 
correlated with cognitive ability.   
Development of cohesive decision-making measures would help improve the 
study of decision-making as it relates to particular real-world situations such as career 
decision-making, medical decision-making, mental illness, and health-related behaviors. 
For example, Bruine de Bruin et al. (2007), in the validation process of the ADMC, found 
that overall ADMC performance was associated with self-reported real world decision 
outcomes after controlling for cognitive ability. Better ADMC performance was 
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consistent with experiencing fewer negative outcomes (e.g. spending a night in jail, 
throwing out groceries) due to poor decisions.  
The ecological validity of decision-making research may be improved by 
considering decision domain. Soane and Chmiel (2005) found differential prediction of 
risk preference from personality traits across domains. For example, Conscientiousness 
significantly predicted risk preference in work, finance, and health domains, but 
Extraversion and Openness to Experience were only predictors of risk preference in the 
work domain. Similarly, Agreeableness was most relevant in predicting risk preference in 
the finance domain. It may be that the context of the decision moderates the predictive 
power of the personality trait on the decision outcome. For example, highly agreeable 
individuals may make better decisions in social domains while highly open individuals 
may make better decisions in the career domain. According to previous research, it would 
appear that Conscientiousness is important in many areas, which is consistent with 
characteristics of Conscientiousness including deliberateness, competence, and self-
discipline (McCrae & Costa, 2010). 
While the current research did not have adequate statistical power to conduct 
additional analyses, future research may benefit from measuring more nuanced 
personality traits. Analysis of the facet scales of the NEO-PI-3 may yield valuable 
information as to the specific personality traits that predict decision-making skill. For 
example, low impulsiveness, which is one facet of Neuroticism, has been related to poor 
performance on the BART indicating unwillingness to take risks to achieve a gain 
(Bornovalova et al., 2009). However, low Neuroticism, which may include low 
impulsiveness, has been found to be related to a tendency to take risk to achieve a gain, 
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which would correspond to better BART performance (Lauriola & Levin, 2001). 
Anxiety, another facet of Neuroticism, has been found to be an important predictor of 
decision-making across multiple studies (e.g. Bensi et al., 2010; Maner et al., 2007; Miu 
et al., 2008). Investigation of this facet of Neuroticism may yield more nuanced 
understanding of the relationships between personality and decision-making. 
A similar case may be made for Conscientiousness. Perfectionism, which may be 
considered a combination of the order and achievement-striving facets of 
Conscientiousness has been found to be related to performance on a decision-making task 
in which the subjects were aware of relative gains and losses (compared to the IGT in 
which they are not aware of the gains and losses prior to their decision; Brand & 
Altstotter-Gleich, 2008). Perhaps these facets of Conscientiousness predict performance 
on specific tasks, but the overall trait is not specific to the nuances of decision-making 
performance.  
The current research sought to determine the relationship between personality and 
decision-making. Prior research had failed to use the NEO-PI-3, the most valid and 
reliable measure of the Big Five personality traits. Despite the abundance of decision-
making measures, prior research had failed to compare the relationships between 
personality traits and decision-making across decision-making tasks. Results were both 
consistent and inconsistent with prior research. Future research may benefit from more 
cohesive decision-making measures, more nuanced measures of personality, and the 
inclusion of measures of cognitive ability. 
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